

Honorable James L. Robart

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

BOMBARDIER INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MITSUBISHI AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,  
MITSUBISHI AIRCRAFT CORPORATION  
AMERICA INC., AEROSPACE TESTING  
ENGINEERING & CERTIFICATION INC.,  
MICHEL KORWIN-SZYMANOWSKI,  
LAURUS BASSON, MARC-ANTOINE  
DELARCHE, CINDY DORNÉVAL, KEITH  
AYRE, AND JOHN AND/OR JANE DOES 1-  
88,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-01543-JLR

BOMBARDIER INC.'S REPLY TO  
DEFENDANT MITSUBISHI  
AIRCRAFT CORPORATION'S  
OPPOSITION TO BOMBARDIER  
INC.'S UPDATED MOTION FOR  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION  
AGAINST MITSUBISHI  
AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,  
MARC-ANTOINE DELARCHE,  
AND KEITH AYRE

**NOTE ON MOTION**

**CALENDAR:**

**MAY 17, 2019**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Nothing in the Opposition of Mitsubishi Aircraft Corporation (“MITAC”) diminishes the fact that Bombardier has made a clear showing of the following: (1) Bombardier owns trade secrets embodied in the 11 documents forming the basis of this preliminary injunction motion; (2) it has a likelihood of success on the merits of this litigation; (3) it is suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable harm; and (4) the public interests of fair competition and public safety favor granting the injunction. The requested injunction is warranted and proper.

## II. ARGUMENT

### A. The Documents and Information at Issue Constitute Trade Secrets

The documents and information Bombardier has placed at issue in this matter qualify for trade secret protection. MITAC’s arguments to the contrary lack merit.

#### 1. The Subject Documents Are Not Bombardier’s Only Trade Secrets Or Even The Only Trade Secrets At Issue In This Litigation

As an initial matter, it is imperative to note that Bombardier has moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to bar MITAC and its affiliates from using only 11 specific documents and the information derived therefrom (“the Subject Documents”). (*See generally* Updated Mot. for Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. # 146.) Those 11 documents may be the only Bombardier trade secrets that are subject to the instant preliminary injunction motion, but they are far from the entire universe of Bombardier trade secrets and far from the only trade secret documents at issue in this litigation. Bombardier’s decision to seek preliminary relief based only on 11 documents now known to have been improperly acquired and believed to be in use does not mean this lawsuit is limited to those 11 documents. Indeed, Bombardier expects to uncover numerous additional documents and things that embody or contain Bombardier trade secrets, all of which will become pertinent to this litigation.

Discovery is not yet open. Bombardier’s formal investigation is incipient. Much remains to be learned, and Bombardier expects to identify quite a few more trade secrets which have been misappropriated. However, the urgency of imminent, irreparable harm has

1 compelled Bombardier to move forward on what it currently knows, seeking preliminary  
2 relief as to the 11 documents that constitute the most obvious instances of misappropriation.

### 3 **2. Bombardier's Certification Roadmap Is A Trade Secret**

4 Contrary to MITAC's repeated argument, and as this Court has already acknowledged,  
5 compilations of otherwise publicly available information can be trade secrets. "[T]he  
6 compilation of publicly available data can be a trade secret, even if that data is publicly  
7 available in more than one place." (Dkt. # 111, at 16-17 (citing *United States v. Nosal*, 844  
8 F.3d 1024, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016)).) Such is the case here. The Subject Documents are the  
9 culmination of decades of certification know-how which is not generally known. That  
10 information includes compilations of business data such as aircraft configuration, flight test  
11 profiles, applicable regulatory sections and data assumptions required for certification that  
12 were compiled by Bombardier over decades of certification efforts, and forms part of  
13 Bombardier's playbook for obtaining certifications. (Burns Decl., Dkt. # 5, ¶¶ 3-26; Tidd  
14 Decl., Dkt. # 7, ¶¶ 2-7; First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Dkt. # 143, ¶¶ 24, 68.) This is the  
15 type of information that the DTSA and WUTSA are intended to safeguard. *See Earthbound*  
16 *Corp. v. MiTek USA, Inc.*, No. C16-1150 RSM, 2016 WL 4418013, at \*10-11 (W.D. Wash.  
17 Aug. 19, 2016) (finding plaintiff's compilations of business data protectable trade secrets  
18 under both the DTSA and WUTSA and granting injunction).

### 19 **3. The Information in the Subject Documents Constitutes Trade Secrets**

20 Each of the Subject Documents meets the criteria for proprietary compilations of  
21 business data (trade secret subject matter) even though some of that business data may be the  
22 identification of certain publicly available regulations or other public documents. For  
23 example, Mr. Dan Burns, Bombardier's Senior Director for Product Integrity, painstakingly  
24 reviewed each of the Subject Documents and specifically identified how the particular data  
25 compiled and synthesized in each would not be readily ascertained without access to those  
26 documents. (*See* Burns Decl., Dkt. # 5, ¶¶ 3-26.) MITAC's argument that it has not been  
27 notified of exactly what trade secrets are at issue simply defies reason. The Subject

Documents show how to navigate clean-sheet certification for each of several components and systems of a new airplane. (Burns Decl., Dkt # 5, *passim*.) As MITAC knows only too well after a decade of futility, the pathway to certification is far from obvious using publicly available information alone. Bombardier's Subject Documents provide an extraordinary advantage in the certification process and qualify as protectable trade secret subject matter.

#### **4. Bombardier Has Standing**

MITAC's argument that Bombardier does not own its trade secrets is meritless. (Opp'n, Dkt. # 165, at 11.) Bombardier did not transfer its trade secrets with the C-Series program as alleged by MITAC. Just because Bombardier used its trade secrets in certifying the C-Series aircraft does not make them an asset of the C-Series. The trade secrets apply across multiple types of aircraft.

Even if Bombardier did transfer some of its trade secret rights as MITAC contends (and they did not), even MITAC admits that such a transfer was only partial because Bombardier continues to own an interest in those trade secrets. Tellingly, MITAC cites no authority for the proposition that 100% ownership of a trade secret is necessary for standing. Contrary to MITAC's argument, a license alone is sufficient for standing. *See, e.g.*, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(4) (defining "owner" as including a person with license to the trade secret); *see also BladeRoom Group Ltd. v. Facebook, Inc.*, 219 F. Supp. 3d 984, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2017)). For those reasons, Bombardier has standing to bring this suit.

#### **B. MITAC Acquired and Used the Subject Documents**

MITAC's argument that it has neither acquired nor used Bombardier's trade secrets also lacks merit.

##### **1. MITAC's Reliance Upon A Stated Policy Of Respecting Other Parties' Trade Secrets Is Unavailing**

MITAC's position that it never wanted anything to do with the Subject Documents is belied by the evidence. MITAC's certification efforts were failing badly. (FAC, Dkt. # 143, ¶¶ 36-50.) It had suffered delay after delay with no end in sight. (*Id.*) MITAC was desperately

1 recruiting engineers with certification experience to try and salvage a project years behind  
 2 schedule and billions of dollars over budget. (*Id.* ¶¶ 51-58.) There is undisputed, and in most  
 3 cases confirmed, evidence that several former Bombardier employees improperly retained the  
 4 Subject Documents which all coincide exactly with the new duties of those employees now  
 5 working on MRJ certification. (*See* Order, Dkt. # 136, at 17 (“[t]hese trade secrets also relate  
 6 to the exact reason that [the Corporate Defendants] recruited these employees”).) And  
 7 MITAC’s argument in defense now, against the overwhelming tide of evidence to the  
 8 contrary, is that its senior management has adopted a policy to not use the trade secrets of  
 9 other companies. (Opp’n, Dkt. # 165 at 12 (citing *Nat’l City Bank, N.A. v. Prime Lending,*  
 10 *Inc.*, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1267 (E.D. Wash. 2010)).)

11 MITAC’s implausible argument is unavailing. If simply adopting a policy against  
 12 using the misappropriated trade secrets of others were sufficient to defeat a showing of a  
 13 likelihood of success on the merits of a trade secret misappropriation claim, preliminary  
 14 injunctions could be avoided with a wink and a nod, so long as corporate employers instructed  
 15 their personnel to refrain from misappropriating trade secrets.

16 Here, MITAC misstates facts and disregards other uncontroverted evidence of  
 17 misappropriation, including that the individual defendants retained unauthorized copies of  
 18 marked Bombardier proprietary information years after their departure from Bombardier; that  
 19 they went to work on the MRJ project in the same roles they occupied while at Bombardier;  
 20 that they had no reason in the final weeks, days, and hours of their employment with  
 21 Bombardier to retain copies of those documents for any legitimate reason; that at least some  
 22 individual defendants still have possession, custody, and control of their unauthorized copies  
 23 of the Subject Documents; and that those individual defendants continue to work on MRJ  
 24 certification. These facts are uncontroverted and drastically undermine MITAC’s positions.

25 Even more damaging to MITAC is the fact that the evidence of record contradicts its  
 26 position now. Without the cloud of litigation over its head, MITAC’s Team Leader of Ice  
 27 Protection Systems for the MRJ, Mr. Koki Fukuda, reached out to Keith Ayre while still a



1 Bombardier employee with direct, technical, certification-related questions which Mr. Fukuda  
2 was happy to receive. (*See* FAC, Dkt. # 143, ¶ 78.)

3 Against this backdrop, MITAC's declarations claiming that none of the Subject  
4 Documents are in MITAC's possession or being used is simply unavailing. For example,  
5 MITAC submits the declaration of Hiroyuki Morino, a department Manager at MITAC, for  
6 the proposition that he has never seen anyone using Bombardier documents on his team.  
7 (Morino Decl., Dkt # 176 at ¶ 8.) However, Mr. Morino also states that he has "never seen a  
8 Bombardier production flight test profile" (*id.* ¶ 8), so he would be unable to testify as to  
9 whether his team had ever relied upon information *derived from* Bombardier test profiles or  
10 other documents. Under these circumstances, Mr. Morino's testimony should be given little  
11 to no weight. *See, e.g., Cascade Fin. Corp. v. Issaquah Community Bank*, C07-1106Z, 2007  
12 WL 2871981, at \*15 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 27, 2007) (giving little weight to "self-serving"  
13 declarations submitted in opposition to motion for preliminary injunction). *Pate v. Bodega*  
14 *Latina Corp.*, CV15-4228-GHK (AGRX), 2015 WL 12661924, at \*5 (C.D. Cal. July 30,  
15 2015) (finding that motion for preliminary injunction opponent's "self-serving and ambiguous  
16 statements ... hold little weight").

## 17 **2. MITAC's Search For Bombardier Documents Was Inadequate At Best**

18 MITAC's argument—that it is not in possession of any of the Subject Documents or  
19 the information contained therein—is also founded upon an alleged "search" specifically for  
20 the Subject Documents residing on select MITAC computer servers and/or laptops. (Opp'n,  
21 Dkt. # 165, at 12.) That argument is fatally flawed for numerous reasons.

22 First, the supposed "search" performed by MITAC appears to have been carefully  
23 orchestrated *not* to find any Bombardier documents. For example, MITAC never involved  
24 Bombardier in that search or elicited any input from Bombardier regarding how that search  
25 should be performed. MITAC never even asked Bombardier to suggest search terms that  
26 could be used to locate the Subject Documents on MITAC's computing systems. Even now,  
27 MITAC fails to explain its search methodology or even when such searches were performed.

1 It appears from the declaration of Hajime Kanja that the *contents* of files residing on MITAC  
2 servers were not even searched, only the file *names*. (*See* Kanja Decl., Dkt # 171, ¶ 3.)

3 Even more troubling, the search terms allegedly used by MITAC's search team are  
4 woefully inadequate. (*See id.* at Exhibit A (listing 23 search terms used).) Tellingly, MITAC's  
5 purported search for Bombardier confidential documents on its servers did not even use  
6 obvious search terms like "BOMBARDIER" or "CONFIDENTIAL" or "PROPRIETARY."  
7 Any legitimate electronic search would not have omitted these obvious search terms. It  
8 appears that the terms MITAC searched were carefully selected to avoid finding anything  
9 damaging. And even employing these best efforts, they still uncovered that Defendant Cindy  
10 Dornéval affirmatively uploaded to her personal MITAC laptops Bombardier's  
11 BM7002.02.15.02 – Flight Performances.pdf (Exhibit A to the Declaration of David Tidd,  
12 Dkt. # 8). (Declaration of Duc Nguyen, Dkt. # 178, ¶ 7.)

### 13 **C. Bombardier's Trade Secrets Have Enormous Value to MITAC**

#### 14 **1. That The MRJ Is Different From Bombardier's C-Series Is A Red Herring**

15 MITAC misguidedly contends that any information contained in the documents at  
16 issue would not be useful on the MRJ project. (Opp'n, Dkt. # 165, at 3.) The contention  
17 strains credulity for a host of reasons. First, it assumes that the documents at issue pertain  
18 only to Bombardier's C-Series aircraft, an assumption dispelled at least in part by the  
19 documents themselves. (*See, e.g.,* Burns Decl., Dkt. # 5, ¶ 5 (identifying Bombardier  
20 information pertaining to its "Global 7000/8000 and [] CRJ" aircraft, the latter directly  
21 competitive with the MRJ).) Second, it mistakenly ignores the potential application of the  
22 information to aircraft in general. (*See id.* ¶¶ 7, 12, 15, 18, 20 (explaining the value of the  
23 information to anyone seeking to certify an aircraft, not just a regional jet); *see also* Borfitz  
24 Decl., Dkt. # 88, ¶¶ 11-17, 19-20, 22, 24, 28, 33; Waterhouse Decl., Dkt. # 89, ¶ 25.) Third, it  
25 ignores the realities of aircraft certification, as well as party admissions concerning the same.  
26 (FAC, Dkt. # 143, ¶ 35 (noting that Defendant Korwin-Szymanowski and an officer of  
27 MITAC are quoted as stating "It's almost impossible to understand the full certification

criteria for an aircraft, if one has not been through it once or twice.”); *see also* Waterhouse Decl., Dkt. # 89, ¶¶ 14-16.) MITAC would have the Court believe that unless certification information contained in the documents at issue can be applied without modification to a different aircraft, it would have no value. Even MITAC’s own experts deny such a conclusion. (*See* Boyd Decl., Dkt. # 77, ¶ 64(g).)

**a. Bombardier’s Flap Skew Detection Information Has Value to MITAC**

MITAC’s argument that the trade secrets surrounding Bombardier’s flap skew detection systems (“SDS”) would have no value to MITAC is incorrect and misguided. The dissimilarity between the systems is irrelevant because “the regulations do not envision types of flap actuation systems in a manufacturer’s design. Rather, the regulatory standards provide the minimum standards that must be met for a given design.” (*See* Borfitz Decl., Dkt. # 88, ¶ 19.) Indeed, “the MRJ and Global 7000 flap and flap skew systems are considered equal by the regulations and the methods of compliance will certainly be similar if not identical,” and it would be “relatively simple to translate the SDS compliance plan from the Global 7000 to the MITAC MRJ.” (*Id.*)

**b. Bombardier’s Type Certification Reports Have Value to MITAC**

MITAC’s argument that the MRJ’s use of a “pitot-static” system different from Bombardier’s is also flawed. As Bombardier’s technical expert Nigel Waterhouse explained, “whether MITAC could use this data to obviate its own need for testing is not the point. [The RAA-BS503-414 and RAA-BA500-414-RevA type certification documents] provide at least an approved point of reference for the certification of aircraft pitot static systems. They provide a certification basis, a method, approved results, a report structure and format that is known and accepted by the regulatory authorities. Use of these reports save MITAC the effort of compiling this information themselves.” (Waterhouse Decl., Dkt. # 89, ¶ 46.) This alone provides tremendous value to MITAC in certification efforts.

**c. Regulations Apply Equally to C-Series, Global 7000/8000, and MRJ**

Bombardier's expert Mr. Michael Borfitz testified that for purposes of CFR Part 25, Bombardier's C-Series and Global 7000/8000 and MITAC's MRJ are to be treated similarly. (See Borfitz Decl., Dkt. # 88, ¶¶ 10-13.) Additionally, "[t]here are several official FAA guidance documents that clearly state similarity is an acceptable means of compliance (MOC). Any data obtained by one manufacturer from another may be used to obtain certification credit regardless of how that data was obtained. Based on this alone, it can be shown that the Bombardier Documents are extremely useful and valuable to MITAC." (Waterhouse Decl., Dkt. # 89, ¶ 23.)

**2. Bombardier Documents Have Value in JCAB Certification**

**a. Bombardier's Trade Secrets Assist in FAA, TCCA, JCAB, and EASA Certification**

MITAC again makes the argument that the Subject Documents are of no use with any certifying agency other than the TCCA. (Opp'n, Dkt. # 165, 2-5.) That argument is flatly false. It is widely known in the aviation industry that "[t]here is a current Part 25 bilateral agreement with [TCCA], and the FAA recognizes and accepts [TCCA's] certifications." (Borfitz Decl., Dkt. # 88, ¶¶ 14-15.) It is similarly known that JCAB accepts FAA certifications and heavily relies upon FAA regulations. (*Id.* ¶ 15 ("a Japanese applicant can literally copy a proposed certification plan from a Canadian applicant and present that plan to the JCAB with little or no modification, and reasonably expect that plan to be accepted, because both regulators refer directly to the FAA requirements as a common source"); see Japan Bilateral Aviation Safety Executive Agreement, available at [https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air\\_cert/international/bilateral\\_agreements/baa\\_basa\\_listing/media/Japan\\_Executive\\_Agreement.pdf](https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/international/bilateral_agreements/baa_basa_listing/media/Japan_Executive_Agreement.pdf). See also FAC, Dkt. # 143, ¶ 34 (identifying uniform standards applicable across FAA, TCCA, and JCAB).)

**b. MITAC's Argument That Certification Experience With Certifying Authorities Other Than JCAB Is Detrimental Defies Common Sense**

Through its Head of Certification Management Office ("CMO"), Andrew Telesca, MITAC argues that experience certifying airplanes before the other certifying agencies around the world is not only unhelpful, it is in fact a detriment to certification before the JCAB. (Opp'n, Dkt. # 165, at 4; Telesca Decl., Dkt. # 175, ¶ 12.) That statement not only defies the evidence, it defies common sense. MITAC, together with MITAC America and AeroTEC, advertised extensively in search of engineers who had experience in aircraft certification. (FAC, Dkt. # 143, ¶¶ 51-58.) The JCAB has not certified a clean-sheet aircraft in half a century. (Declaration of John D. Denkenberger, Dkt. #143-1, Ex. 36). Accordingly, the only engineers alive with aircraft certification experience who MITAC could recruit are necessarily those with experience certifying aircraft before agencies other than the JCAB. Common sense dictates that if non-JCAB certification experience is a detriment, MITAC would not continue to recruit engineers with such experience.

In addition, Mr. Telesca, (again, the Head of MITAC's Certification Management Office), tells a very different story to the media than he does to this Court. When speaking publicly—without the motivation of litigation behind his statements—Mr. Telesca says "working closely with the JCAB and the FAA will help make certification with aviation authorities in other countries a much smoother process." (Decl. of John D. Denkenberger ¶ 2, Ex. A.) "Having the FAA on board at the same time [as the JCAB] makes things more efficient." (*Id.*)

Finally, MITAC's argument that the JCAB is being more stringent and requiring MITAC to "return to core aeronautical principles" to achieve certification (Opp'n, Dkt. # 165, at 4-5; Telesca Decl. Dkt. # 175, ¶ 13) actually suggests a *greater* need for use of documents detailing precisely how certification can be achieved; documents like those taken from Bombardier which detail exactly the principles which need be proven to achieve certification.

1 Notwithstanding MITAC's unsubstantiated arguments to the contrary, certification  
 2 experience before the TCCA and the FAA is by far the most relevant and valuable experience  
 3 to MITAC's certification efforts at the JCAB. That is why MITAC has been recruiting those  
 4 engineers. It is MITAC's *actions* in recruiting Bombardier personnel and obtaining  
 5 Bombardier information, not MITAC's arguments, that reveal the true value of Bombardier's  
 6 trade secret information to MRJ certification.

### 7 **c. The Number of Employees And Documents Is Irrelevant**

8 MITAC attempts to diminish the value of Bombardier's information by suggesting  
 9 that the number of trade secrets misappropriated by MITAC and its affiliates is *de minimis*.  
 10 MITAC misses the point. The number of documents at issue has no bearing on the overall  
 11 value of those documents. For example, and by no means limiting, one document  
 12 misappropriated by Cindy Dornéval and stored on a MITAC America computer—by  
 13 MITAC's own admission (Nguyen Decl., Dkt. # 178, ¶ 7)—represents the standard used for  
 14 the CRJ-900 Computerized Airplane Flight Manual (“CAFM”) and contains the complete  
 15 methodology used to derive and develop the performance parameters for not only the CRJ-  
 16 900, but also *for all new and future Bombardier aircraft designs*. (See Tidd Declaration, Ex.  
 17 A, Dkt. # 8, at 1.) “To be clear, there is a large volume of significant information contained  
 18 within the [document] that is proprietary to Bombardier beyond [] cited examples. Just a  
 19 quick glance at the CAFM Methodology, or any document containing the information within  
 20 the CAFM Methodology, would readily demonstrate that it is obviously the result of  
 21 extraordinary investments in time and resources in design, development, and testing.” (Tidd  
 22 Decl., Dkt. # 7, ¶ 5.) This hardly constitutes *de minimis* misappropriation.

### 23 **D. The Harm To Bombardier Is Real, Imminent And Irreparable**

24 MITAC's argument that Bombardier will not suffer irreparable harm is without merit.

#### 25 **1. The Irreparable Harm To Bombardier Is Imminent Absent Injunction**

26 Public pronouncements uniformly put MITAC's anticipated date for certification of  
 27 the MRJ at mid-2019. (FAC, Dkt. # 143, ¶ 49.) MITAC's anticipated certification window is

1 therefore now open. If the MRJ reaches its goal of certification before an injunction issues,  
 2 then the injury to Bombardier is complete. Money damages will be insufficient to remediate  
 3 the damage in value to Bombardier's once proprietary trade secrets.

## 4 **2. Bombardier Did Not Unduly Delay By Respecting Due Process**

5 MITAC's opposition papers reveal much about its culture of eschewing the proper for  
 6 the expedient. MITAC actually criticizes Bombardier for (1) filing this lawsuit here in the  
 7 proper jurisdiction rather than "trying" to file somewhere else, and (2) pursuing service under  
 8 the Hague Convention as the Federal Rules require rather than trying to bypass proper service.  
 9 (Opp'n, Dkt. # 165, at 21.) MITAC actually argues that Bombardier's "strategy" of properly  
 10 following the rules resulted in "unnecessary delay." (*Id.*) Bombardier can hardly be criticized  
 11 for honoring the due process rights of the Defendants, particularly when it was MITAC that  
 12 unnecessarily delayed proceedings by repeatedly refusing to waive service under the Hague  
 13 Convention—even when its lawyers were already participating in this case. (*See* Declaration  
 14 of John D. Denkenberger, Dkt. # 107, ¶¶ 2-4.)

## 15 **E. A Private Agreement Does Nothing Except Beg For More Protracted Litigation.**

16 MITAC makes much ado about the fact that it has already offered to abide by the  
 17 terms of the proposed injunction by private agreement, but again MITAC misses the point.  
 18 Bombardier needs the power of an injunction, and the threat of contempt sanctions, to  
 19 properly dissuade MITAC from using Bombardier's trade secrets. A private agreement, rather  
 20 than a clear and narrowly tailored court order, would only invite more litigation as the parties  
 21 battle privately over intentional "misunderstandings" about the breadth and scope of the  
 22 agreement. The power and clarity of a court order, not publicity, is needed to ensure timely  
 23 and complete compliance by MITAC.

## 24 **F. MITAC's Remaining Arguments Undermine Prior Arguments**

25 MITAC's argument concerning the impermissible vagueness and overbreadth of the  
 26 proposed terms of the preliminary injunction contradicts all its other arguments. On the one  
 27 hand, MITAC admits that it was ready to privately abide by the very terms of Bombardier's



1 proposed order (Opp’n, Dkt. # 165, at 10), yet on the other it argues that those terms are  
 2 unenforceably vague for a Court Order (*id.* at 22-23). MITAC fails to explain why it would  
 3 know how to comport its behavior for private purposes yet lack “fair and precisely drawn  
 4 notice of what the injunction” would prohibit. (*Id.*) Moreover, MITAC claims that the  
 5 documents “are filled with public information,” and it should not be subject to contempt for  
 6 using public information contained in those documents. (*Id.*) MITAC can avoid any contempt  
 7 simply by acquiring the purportedly public information contained in Bombardier’s documents  
 8 from public—rather than Bombardier—sources.

9 Additionally, MITAC cannot rationally explain how the balance of hardships favors  
 10 MITAC in this instance, particularly after it has admitted that it was willing to comply with  
 11 the very terms of Bombardier’s proposed order in exchange for a withdrawal of Bombardier’s  
 12 Motion. Its “sky is falling” argument referencing potential lost MRJ sales resulting from the  
 13 public announcement of an injunction is baseless. (*Id.* at 9, 22-23.)

14 Finally, MITAC’s Bond Argument undermines its previous representations that it does  
 15 not have the Bombardier information at issue, that it never used such information, that it lacks  
 16 any knowledge of the information, and that the information would not be useful in any MRJ  
 17 applications. If these arguments are true, then public confidence in the MRJ should remain  
 18 unaffected by any injunction, and the resulting bond amount should be negligible.

### 19 III. CONCLUSION

20 For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons identified in its Motion, Bombardier  
 21 respectfully requests that the Court maintain the status quo and grant the narrowly tailored  
 22 injunction requested against MITAC.



1 Dated this 17th day of May, 2019.

2  
3 CHRISTENSEN O'CONNOR  
JOHNSON KINDNESS<sup>PLLC</sup>  
4

5  
6 s/ John D. Denkenberger

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**Certificate of service**

I hereby certify that on May 17, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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